



JYVÄSKYLÄN YLIOPISTO
UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

Attesting the Verticals


Prof. Ian Oliver

Faculty of IT

University of Jyväskylä, Finland



How we got here...




Attesting these to attesting these...

...while not forgetting about the rest of the World...




How we got here...



The internet of **attestable** things

Attestable?
Trustable?

Nokia Attestation Engine
- TPM2, VNF, Containers...





How we got here...

WhatTheXYZamIamdoing.txt



How we got here...



Surprisingly this isn't enough....






Verticals

- Railways, Medical (our first targets)
 - Industry 4.0/IoT/Edge, but you might kill someone
 - Extra requirements (apart from the safety thing), eg: latency, accuracy, resiliency etc.
 - Not just devices, but “trusted data/control plane”
 - At lot of things need attesting
 - End-to-End
 - Integration with Infrastructure, eg: 5G/6G
 - Interesting failure modes:





Big Picture





Smaller Picture


CRTM->Chain of Trust

Chains of Trust

Cross-referencing

Web of Trust



Webs of Trust





Questions Arising


- What other structures exist? Higher-order webs of trust? Systems thinking
- A formal, ontological model
- **SYSTEMS THINKING**
- What other trust relationships are there?
- What kinds of trust do we want?
- Logical reasoning
- Trust is not binary....subjective, time based...
- What are the mathematics of trust?
- Does it differentiate/integrate over time, d_trust/dt ?
- Quantum trust?
- Risk and Game Theory





OpenRAN (ORAN)

- O-RU runs on hardware (gNB)
- O-DU/O-CU are “generally” container based on cloud
- SMO contains remote attestation server
- O-DU/O-CU communicate with and run on NFV environments
- 5G core runs within an NFV environment
- NFV has MANO
- Mutli-vendor
- Exercise: trusted(X), trusts(X,Y), runson(X)
- If a gNB becomes untrusted, what does this means
- Webs of trust, eg: 5G core vs O-Cloud





Next Steps

Ontologies for trust are required for formalisation - more powerful models

Other structures: cross-referencing, webs, multiple chains of trust

Better definitions of “trusted” -> Systems Thinking/Engineering

Metrics $a_0 \mid \text{untrusted} > + a_1 \mid \text{trusted} > + a_2 \mid \text{eh?} > + \dots a_n \mid \setminus _ (\text{ツ}) _ / >$

TPMs and Enclaves are not a full solution

Tooling (Jane, was NAE). <https://gitlab.jyu.fi/ijoliver/jane>. <- DEMO AVAILABLE NOW

Interesting cases: Medical, Defence, Aerospace

Forensics, Failure Modes and Responses

- Borger, Ravidas, Turcanu - Container Trust
- Backman - Railway
- Jatkola - Blockchain, supply-chain, data trust
- Thore - Enclaves + TPM + Containers
- Kuure -> ORAN
- David -> Nuclear
- Risto, Sunden -> Digital Forensics

The screenshot shows a web application interface for TPM attestation. The URL is <https://192.168.1.203:8540/session/983b7fc9-5480-44be-b8f2-74c733c10744>. The interface includes a navigation bar with "Elements", "Claims", "Results", "Attest", "Structures", "New", and "Help". Below the navigation bar is a table with the following data:

Field	Value
ItemID	983b7fc9-5480-44be-b8f2-74c733c10744
Opened	2023-07-12 18:07:25.625356316 +0000 UTC
Closed	2023-07-12 18:07:26.218047827 +0000 UTC
#Claims / #Results	1 / 4
Message	Single invocation from WebUI at 2023-07-12 18:07:20.308187923 +0000 UTC

Below the table is a "Result Types" legend with a large green circle indicating a successful result. The legend includes:

- Pass (Green)
- Fail (Red)
- VF (Grey)
- VCA (Dark Grey)
- NR (Black)
- MEV (Light Grey)
- RCF (White)
- U (Black)

Below the legend is a table of attestation results:

Field	Result	Value
tpm2_attestedValue	Pass	2023-07-12 18:07:25.947731525 +0000 UTC
tpm2_firmware	Pass	2023-07-12 18:07:26.020973065 +0000 UTC
tpm2_magicNumber	Pass	2023-07-12 18:07:26.072979278 +0000 UTC
tpm2_safe	Pass	2023-07-12 18:07:26.148406538 +0000 UTC

PhD Positions available

- trusted/confidential computing
- quantum trust